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*By Maria L.  Fornella 
On Tuesday night, speaking to an audience of Army cadets at West Point 
Academy in a much anticipated response to his general’s request for additional 
troops, President Obama announced a new strategy for the war in Afghanistan. 
It was a somber speech, delivered with his usual trademark of logic, rhetorical 
skill and assertiveness, but also with a certain emotion. At crucial moments in it, 
Obama looked straight into the camera, making direct eye-contact with the 
individual spectator, summoning his support in an effort he seems to be taking 
up somewhat reluctantly. He outlined a new strategy for the eight-year old war 
that will include immediate deployment of 30,000 new US troops to protect 
civilians, clear and defeat the insurgents and train Afghan forces in order to be 
able to begin the draw down in eighteen months. This new surge will be 
supplemented by additional NATO troops and Afghan national forces to meet 
the original 40,000 troops demanded by General McCrystal.  After three 
months of deliberation, the President has decided to heed the advice of his 
generals and his Defense Secretary, and proceed with a military escalation of the 
conflict. In so doing, he rejected the logic of Vice President Biden who 
rhetorically asked earlier this year why the US spent 30 times as much in 
Afghanistan as it did in Pakistan, when it was well-known that Al Qaeda or what 
is left of it, is in the tribal regions of Pakistan. Lately he had argued against more 
troops (because the central government was an unreliable, weak and corrupt 
partner) and in favor of shifting the mission to killing or capturing main 
insurgency leaders, establishing more ties with local tribal leaders  and giving 
more support to Pakistan. On Wednesday morning, however, Biden appeared in 
the morning news shows to defend the President’s decision unequivocally. 
 
The next morning, in hearings before the Senate’s Armed Forces Committee, 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton fleshed out the main objectives of the surge 
more fully: training Afghan forces, eliminating safe havens, stabilizing a region 
fundamental to American national security. She also emphasized the 
importance of the parallel “civilian surge” which the President had also 
mentioned in passing and whose job will be to develop the agricultural base 
away from opium and to further strengthen institutions at every level of Afghan 
society, so as “not to leave chaos behind” when troops are drawn down and 
responsibility is transferred to the Afghan government. Finally, she stressed the 
need to develop long-term relations with both Afghanistan and Pakistan. 
Indeed, Obama’s three-pronged strategy includes not only military and civilian 
components for counter insurgence and institution-building, but also a strategic 
partnership with Pakistan, whose government can help contain the Taliban, 
destroy Al Qaeda and prevent it from gaining access to nuclear material. 
Unfortunately, during his speech the President did not spend much time 
explaining the importance of that relationship. Another important omission was 
the inclusion of other regional actors in the process of conflict resolution. But 
the truth is Obama was performing an extremely difficult balancing act, trying 
to simultaneously gain the support of disparate groups at home and abroad for a 
last-ditch effort to win an eight year old war in a context of war fatigue, massive 
debt and a weak economy. That also explains why in his speech he denied any 
intentions of nation-building (public opinion in the US is strongly against it 
mainly because of the cost and the long-term commitment it implies) and 
instead focused on transferring responsibility to the Afghans themselves for 
their own defense. 
 
In articulating both an escalation and an exit strategy at the same time, the 
President opened himself to criticism from both the Right and the Left. While 
the Right was very supportive of the surge itself, it was quite critical of his 
timeline for withdrawal, which they say, will only embolden insurgents to wait 
the troops out.  The Left of his party, led by Moveon.org, responded negatively 
to the increase of troops, which they regard as “deepening (US) involvement in a 
quagmire.” Meanwhile, and in spite of much commentary to the contrary, the 
White House insists that the President made this decision because he feels it is 
the right one, and that electoral considerations played no role in the process 
(although the withdrawal in the summer of 2011 conveniently coincides with the 
beginning of his presidential campaign for re-election!)  Instead, pundits 
favorable to the President were quick to point out that a time frame was 
absolutely needed to provide a sense of urgency to the Afghan government itself 
so that it will clean up its act and take advantage of this “new window of 
opportunity” as Secretary Clinton put it. However, it is obvious to the same 
pundits that the pace and time of withdrawal will most likely be dictated by the 
conditions on the ground in the summer of 2011 and not by the pre-established 
timetable. Whether it is for political or strategic reasons, the fact is, the 
President has made speed, (that is, a quick deployment of new forces followed 
by quick withdrawal), the central tenet of his new strategy, and while providing 
for a civilian surge, he has underplayed the nation-building aspects of the 
mission for the obvious reason: that they undermine the credibility of a speedy 
exit strategy. 
 
Whether or not this strategy works, his decision on Afghanistan has gained 
Obama some time free from the crushing criticism of the opposition whom he 
has silenced for the moment; he has pleased Independents (66% of whom 
trusted the generals over Obama in planning the war strategy; 48% were in 
favor of more troops, as opposed to only 30% of Democrats);  and he can now 
turn to the two other major challenges facing his administration:  public 
discontent with the economic situation and the battle for health care reform. 
The latter won a major victory two weeks ago when the Senate voted to bring the 
bill to the floor for discussion. Still, between the Thanksgiving break last week 
and the end- of -the -year holidays it is very unlikely this discussion will bear 
fruit within this calendar year, as was the President’s goal.  And the more the bill 
gets delayed the more the public option gets diluted to the point that it will all 
but disappear from a final version. Since April the President’s plan has lost 
Independent support steadily (only 25% of Independents opposed it in April, 
now 50% are against it, while among Democrats it has wide support, with only 
22% opposing the public option). 
 
On the economic front, five times more Independents than Democrats hold 
Obama responsible for what has gone wrong. They blame him for salvaging the 
banks but not their jobs.  In light of this, Obama has summoned a job creation 
“summit” to be held later this week in the White House. While most see it as a 
public relations tactic, with unemployment having surpassed 10%the public is 
demanding action, and job recovery is key to getting the Independent vote back. 
With his approval rate hovering at 50%, the President is in dire need of striking 
some points and delivering some victories before the end of the year.  Amid a 
rising wave of populism that is both anti-Wall Street and anti-government, he 
needs to show that he can make government work.   
 
After a seamless campaign and after months of relying on his own personal 
charisma and his gifted oratory to coax and persuade the public, the magic 
seems to be wearing off: he now needs to find other ways to reach the voters. Of 
course, performance will be the safest one: Independent voters want 
competence and results: they want him to show them that he can govern.  This 
has proven elusive for many reasons beyond his control, but lately some 
mistakes were made that could have been prevented.  
 
This is a young White House and in spite of their mastery of the new 
technologies to connect with young voters and their ability to establish their 
own narrative about the President, in the last few weeks Obama and his close 
advisers seem to have lost some of their attention to details insofar as his public 
image is concerned, for example the importance of certain visual and other non-
verbal signals.  
 
The trip to Asia provides myriad examples of this: the “unforced error” of 
bowing too deep to the Emperor of Japan, which was ridiculed by the media on 
all sides of the political spectrum;  his tense press conference in China during 
which both he and Hu Jintao stiffly read prepared statements, after which 
neither took questions; the town-hall style meeting with students in Shanghai, 
in which he said “the Internet should be free and all should have access to it” but 
which was only shown by local TV and in a very slow live feed on the internet, 
and later all references to it were deleted from all websites. Even a picture of 
Obama alone by the Great Wall of China was interpreted as a bad visual that 
suggested isolation, and while this may be an over-interpretation, there is a 
reason why commentators made that association. Obama is having a very hard 
time keeping his coalition of independents, moderates and liberals together. The 
unraveling of his coalition is constraining every policy choice he makes, as he 
has to measure at every step not only the costs of each decision but also the 
opposition he is likely to face from within his own party. He thus feels limited in 
his choices and picks a middle of the road solution that does not fully satisfy his 
purposes and makes him a target from the two extremes of the political 
spectrum. In many cases, as in the Afghan war,there are no good choices but 
this is hard to confess to a public to whom he promised change and that is 
expecting him to deliver. 
 
With his new Afghan decision President Obama may have swayed many 
hawkish independents to his side but the question is for how long. Soon Obama 
may find that while nation-building abroad may be difficult, nation-building at 
home is a task he cannot postpone any longer. 
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